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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9294
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0011
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 001846

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, NEA/ARP
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2012
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [SU](#) [QA](#)
SUBJECT: MINAWI PRESSES QATAR FOR ASSISTANCE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01133
[1](#)B. SECSTATE 98121

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (SBU) Please see action request para. 4.

[1](#)2. (S) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi traveled to Doha November 21 to 25 as part of a broader effort to solicit political and financial support from Arab capitals for his beleaguered movement. On November 22, Minawi called Poloff from Doha to request that the USG intervene with the Qatari government to underscore his request.

[1](#)3. (S) In late July, Minawi visited Jeddah, where he had requested Saudi assistance to maintain the loyalty of his forces, integrate SLM fighters into the civilian population, and treat the injured (Ref. A). At Minawi's request, the USG had previewed his visit with the Saudi authorities (Ref. B). Despite Minawi's reports of initially positive signals from King Abdullah, however, no assistance was forthcoming. Sudanese Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein traveled to Jeddah two days after Minawi's departure, and, according to conventional SLM wisdom, convinced the Saudis to reverse their decision to provide assistance. CDA Fernandez followed up with the Saudi Ambassador in Khartoum repeatedly to no avail.

Action Request

[1](#)4. (S) While remaining the sole rebel signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), the SLM's inability to secure resources has left it unable to provide tangible benefits to its supporters and vulnerable to manipulation by Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Minawi's support in Darfur--even within his own movement--has plummeted since he signed the agreement, leading to a breakdown in the SLM's command and control structure. In addition, the fate of the SLM serves as a cautionary tale to other rebel movements considering their participation in a renewed peace process for Darfur. Post recommends that the Department and Embassy Doha engage with the Qatari government to encourage their support for providing basic services to the SLM in the interests of securing a durable peace for Darfur. End comment.
FERNANDEZ